Analyzing the Constitutional Implications of the Department of Veterans Affairs\u27 Process to Determine Incompetency: Is the Federal Government Violating the Second Amendment And Due Process by Flynn-Brown, Joshua
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 41
Number 3 Spring 2014 Article 2
1-1-2014
Analyzing the Constitutional Implications of the
Department of Veterans Affairs' Process to
Determine Incompetency: Is the Federal
Government Violating the Second Amendment
And Due Process
Joshua Flynn-Brown
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joshua Flynn-Brown, Analyzing the Constitutional Implications of the Department of Veterans Affairs' Process to Determine Incompetency: Is
the Federal Government Violating the Second Amendment And Due Process, 41 Hastings Const. L.Q. 521 (2014).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol41/iss3/2
Analyzing the Constitutional Implications of
the Department of Veterans Affairs' Process
to Determine Incompetency: Is the Federal
Government Violating the Second
Amendment and Due Process?
by JOSHUA FLYNN-BROWN*
Introduction
Over the past decade, the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
("VA") quietly reported hundreds of thousands of veterans' to the
National Instant Criminal Background Check System.2 As of June 1,
2012, there were 153,298 names on the list with a shocking 99.3% of
them from the VA.' Placement on the list prevents veterans from
obtaining firearms from federal firearms licensees, effectively
precluding exercise of the fundamental right to own a firearm.
Adding insult to injury, placement on the list not only results in a
* Joshua Flynn-Brown is a Staff Attorney and Post-Doctoral Fellow at Chapman
University's Military Law Institute & AMVETS Legal Clinic located in Orange,
California. Many thanks to Professor Kyndra Miller Rotunda and Professor Dwight
Stirling for their invaluable guidance in working through the ideas in this Article. I would
also like to thank Tricia D'Ambrosio-Woodward, Susan Thompson, and Ari Freilich for
their advice and input. And finally, sincere thanks to the Editors and Staff at the Hastings
Constitutional Law Quarterly.
1. The standard employed applies not only to veterans, but also to their
beneficiaries who receive VA benefits. Throughout this Article "veterans, or their
beneficiary" will be referred to as "veterans."
2. The National Instant Criminal Background Check System is a national gun ban
list, which is discussed in more depth in subsequent paragraphs and is hereinafter referred
to as "NICS" or "gun ban list."
3. WILLIAM J. KROUSE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42987, GUN CONTROL
PROPOSALS IN THE 113TH CONGRESS: UNIVERSAL BACKGROUND CHECKS, GUN
TRAFFICKING, AND MILITARY STYLE FIREARMS 23 (2013).
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denial of the constitutional right to firearms but also places veterans
* 4in the same category as convicted criminals.
The process by which the VA adds veterans to the gun ban list is
highly unusual and illegal for one simple reason: the VA overreports
veterans to the list. Once it determines that a veteran requires a
fiduciary to administer benefit payments, the VA automatically
reports that veteran to the gun ban list, consequently denying his or
her right to possess and own firearms. The VA attempts to justify its
actions by relying on a single federal regulation, 38 C.F.R. § 3.353,
which grants limited authority to determine incompetence in the
context of financial incompetence-i.e., whether or not the veteran
can adequately administer benefit payments. The regulation's core
purpose is limited to appointing a fiduciary for financial purposes and
is not designed to deny the right to possess or own firearms.' Yet, the
VA irrationally assumes that a veteran who cannot properly manage
VA payments is a danger to public safety and is incapable of
adequately managing a firearm, thereby justifying adding the
veteran's name to the gun ban list. Not only is the VA intentionally
4. The restrictions are imposed under the authority of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), which also
restricts firearms for convicted felons.
5. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.353(b)(1) (2014) ("Rating agencies have sole authority to make
official determinations of competency and incompetency for purposes of: insurance (38
U.S.C. 1922) and, subject to §13.56 of this chapter, disbursement of benefits."). See also
id. § 3.353(b)(3) ("[If a manager] develops evidence indicating that the beneficiary may be
capable of administering the funds payable without limitation, he or she will refer that
evidence."); Letter from K. Kalama, Veterans Service Manager, Department of Veterans
Affairs, Portland Regional Office, at 2 (Dec. 20, 2012) (on file with author) ("You must
send us medical evidence ... that says you are able to handle your own financial affairs ...
if you believe you are able to handle your VA benefits without anyone's help."). See also,
Letter from P. Zondervan, Veterans Service Manager, Department of Veterans Affairs,
San Diego Regional Office, at 1 (Feb. 26, 2014) (on file with author) ("We propose to rate
you incompetent for VA purposes. This means a fiduciary may be appointed to help
manage your VA benefits.").
6. Every part of the process is designed around a fiduciary appointment. See 38
C.F.R. §13.56 (2014) (direct payment rules for appointed fiduciaries); 38 U.S.C. § 5502
(2005) ("Payments to and supervision of fiduciaries."); 38 U.S.C. § 5507 (2005) ("Inquiry,
investigations, and qualifications of fiduciaries."). See also KROUSE, supra note 3, at 27.
See also M21-1MR Part 3, General Claims Process, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
http://www.benefits.va.gov/WARMS/M21-1MR3.asp (Scroll down to "Subpart IV -
General Rating Process;" scroll down to "Chapter 8 - Competency, Due Process and
Protected Ratings;" click on "Section A" document; scroll down to Topic 2: "Considering
Competency While Evaluating Evidence."), at 8-A-4 and 8-A-5 (2012) (providing for a
"Step 4" (final stage) in the process of determining incompetency and stating a Veterans
Service Representative "establishes EP 290 to control the appointment of a fiduciary, and
prepares VA Form 21-592, Request for Appointment of a Fiduciary, Custodian, or
Guardian, for use by the fiduciary activity").
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misinterpreting and misapplying existing federal firearm restrictions,
it is unconstitutionally applying these federal laws to veterans merely
because they cannot manage VA benefits. Thus, without proper legal
authority and without affording due process of law, the VA subjects
veterans to a broad sweeping firearm ban.' Throughout Supreme
Court jurisprudence there does not exist a case on point that allows
firearm restrictions to be employed based upon a financial
incompetence standard.' Furthermore, in the aftermath of the
Supreme Court holding that the Second Amendment is a
fundamental right, the constitutionality of the VA's conduct is suspect
and worthy of analysis.'
In Section II, this Article applies Second Amendment
jurisprudence as established in District of Columbia v. Heller and
McDonald v. City of Chicago to evaluate the federal law and
regulations the VA relies on to find a veteran incompetent to manage
VA benefits. Currently, the VA is conflating two different standards:
If it deems a veteran unable to handle his or her financial affairs, it
assumes the veteran is a danger to self or others and reports the
veteran's name to a gun ban list. Thus, according to the VA, financial
incompetence is grounds for firearm restriction. In Heller, the Court
held that the Second Amendment "guarantee[s] the individual right
to possess and carry [firearms] in case of confrontation";o and in
McDonald, the Court established the Second Amendment to be a
fundamental right applied equally to the federal government and the
states." Since firearm possession is a fundamental right, Section II
examines the federal laws and regulations addressed herein under
strict scrutiny, which requires the VA to prove that the regulation is
7. Kalama, supra note 5 ("The evidence indicates that you are not able to handle
your VA benefits payments because of a physical or mental condition.... A
determination of incompetence will prohibit you from purchasing, possessing, receiving or
transporting a firearm or ammunition. If you knowingly violate any of these prohibitions,
you may be fined, imprisoned, or both pursuant to the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act.").
8. The most relevant case is District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008),
which references justified firearms restrictions for felons and the mentally ill-individuals
that pose a legitimate risk to the public when in possession of firearms. Furthermore, the
VA definition of insanity is not equivalent to "mental incompetence" at issue in this
Article. Disabled Am. Veterans v. U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 783 F. Supp. 187, 190
(S.D.N.Y. 1992).
9. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3042 (2010).
10. Heller, 554 U.S. at 592.
11. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050.
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narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest.12 This Article
takes the position that in order for the VA's absolute gun ban to
satisfy this standard, the only credible compelling government
interest in the regulation of firearms is public safety, not financial
incompetence. In the context of the strict scrutiny standard, this
Article will examine the fact that VA does not determine whether a
veteran is a danger to self or others to justify regulation. Because
the VA does not complete an analysis to determine if a veteran is a
public safety danger, the VA's laws and regulations do not satisfy the
strict scrutiny standard; therefore, the VA's regulatory conduct is not
narrowly tailored and unconstitutionally infringes on the Second
Amendment.14 Section II concludes by providing examples of less
burdensome alternatives, reinforcing the argument that the VA
regime is not narrowly tailored.
Section III focuses on Fifth Amendment procedural due process.
The Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test is applied to the VA's process
of determining that a veteran is incompetent to handle benefit
payments. In Section III, this Article argues that the standard
employed by the VA is arbitrary and does in fact result in
discriminatory application (99.3 percent of all names on the gun ban
list are from the VA) because the procedural safeguards in place are
wholly inadequate to protect the fundamental nature of the Second
Amendment. Moreover, procedural due process is violated because
12. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) ("[A] government practice or statute
which restricts 'fundamental rights' or which contains 'suspect classifications' is to be
subjected to 'strict scrutiny' and can be justified only if it furthers a compelling
government purpose and, even then, only if no less restrictive alternative is available.");
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[S]trict scrutiny
will be applied to the deprivation of whatever sort of right we consider 'fundamental."').
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) ("As we stated recently in Flores, the
Fourteenth Amendment forbids the government to infringe . . . 'fundamental' liberty
interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.") (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302
(1993)) (internal quotations omitted).
13. The only credible compelling government interest to impose an absolute firearm
ban is that a person is a danger to himself or others, i.e., a public safety risk. This Article
takes the position that a proper definition encompasses a risk of causing "grievous bodily
injury or death upon himself, herself or others." There may be many mental afflictions
that cause someone to be dangerous, however this Article will not discuss the reasons a
person may be dangerous. Rather, this Article will focus on the requirement that the VA
must determine if an individual is, in fact, dangerous.
14. Adding further color to the strict scrutiny test, it appears that the VA believes
that its "compelling government interest" is determining financial incompetence-which is
a compelling government interest not found within strict scrutiny jurisprudence.
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the veteran is not afforded a proper pre-deprivation hearing to
determine if he or she is a public safety danger prior to the imposition
of firearm restrictions.
In Section IV, this Article addresses current legislative fixes
regarding the VA regulatory regime discussed herein. Both the U.S.
House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate introduced the
Veterans Second Amendment Protection Act to prevent reporting to
the gun ban list unless a veteran is deemed a danger to self or others.
But, there are inherent flaws in the legislative language, including the
legislation's failure to properly determine what "danger" means.
That the House and Senate have filed the same legislation confirms
that there is a constitutional problem that requires a fix.
Section V concludes that the VA's gun restriction standard does
not fit inside the bounds of current federal gun laws and that, in the
context of the Second Amendment, the VA's use of the financial
incompetence standard is unconstitutional because it is not narrowly
tailored to determine if the veteran is a danger to self or others. In
the same vein, procedural due process is likewise violated because
there are not proper safeguards in place to protect the fundamental
nature of firearm ownership, including the lack of a pre-deprivation
hearing.
A. Overview of Existing Firearm-Related Law and Its Application to
the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
Let us begin by quickly reviewing relevant firearm laws and their
interplay with the VA. There are two main statutes that regulate the
possession and ownership of firearms: the National Firearms Act of
1934" and the Gun Control Act of 1968, as amended." The National
Firearms Act made it more difficult for citizens to acquire certain
highly lethal firearms, such as machine guns and short-barreled long
guns. 8 The Gun Control Act is the core regulatory mechanism
designed to regulate the buying and selling of firearms, establishing
categories of persons who are prohibited from owning or possessing
firearms." The Gun Control Act was amended by the Brady
Handgun Violence Prevention Act.20 The amendment required
15. National Firearms Act of 1934, 26 U.S.C. § 5801 (2014).
16. Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 921 (2014).
17. KROUSE, supra note 3, at 6.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 8.
20. 18 U.S.C. § 921 (2014).
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completed background checks for all unlicensed persons seeking to
obtain firearms from federal firearms licensees, and it created the
National Instant Criminal Background Check System ("NICS"),
otherwise known as the national gun ban list.21  The most relevant
laws for this Article are the NICS laws and Brady laws, specifically 18
U.S.C. § 922(g).2 The interplay between these provisions is as
follows: Section 922(g) restricts individuals deemed "mentally
defective" from firearm possession and ownership; the Brady laws
created the gun ban list where those ruled "mentally defective" are to
be placed; and the NICS laws require federal agencies, such as the
VA, to report persons deemed "mentally defective" for placement on
said list.3 The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
("ATF") adopted a regulation that defined "mental defective" as
21. KROUSE, supra note 3, at 8, 12; Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub.
L. No. 103-159, § 103(b), 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (codified in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.).
22. NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-180, 121 Stat.
2559, § 101(a)(4)(C) (2008); Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-
159, § 103(b), 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (codified in 18 U.S.C. § 922(t) and other scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C.); Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1216-1221
(1968) (codified in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)).
23. Id. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ("ATF"), an agency of the
U.S. Department of Justice, defines mentally defective as persons "of marked subnormal
intelligence, mentally ill, or mentally incompetent AND [sic] are found to be either a
danger to themselves or to others as a result of mental disease or illness or because of
injury or disease lack the mental capacity to contract or manage their own affairs."
Definitions for the Categories of Persons Prohibited From Receiving Firearms (95R-
051P), 61 Fed. Reg. 47095, 47097 (Sept. 6, 1996) (codified at 27 C.F.R. § 478.11). In a
subsequent sentence, the regulation clarifies this long-winded definition and determines
that the standard does not include these persons "suffering from a mental illness but who
are not a danger to themselves." Id. The VA regulation purports to rule on mental issues
in the context of managing benefits; but, pursuant to the ATF regulation, the VA is
required to also find that the veteran is a danger to him or herself. This requirement is in
lockstep with recent Supreme Court findings such as v. Heller wherein the Court stated
that legitimate firearm restrictions can be employed against dangerous individuals such as
felons or the mentally ill. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008). The
VA does not perform an analysis for subnormal intelligence or mental illness. It does
purport to determine mental incompetence, but such analysis is only designed to appoint a
fiduciary. Likewise, a proper analysis on capacity to contract is not entertained and
cannot practically be performed. See infra notes 92-93. In addition, in order to take a
name off the gun ban list the Attorney General must determine that the person is not a
public safety danger. 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (2003). Accordingly, the defining factor to
impose firearm restrictions is whether a person is dangerous, and financial incompetence
does not equal danger.
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somebody who-among other things-is a danger to himself or
others.24
Separate and distinct from these laws and regulations, the VA
adopted a regulation in the 1970s that governs the determination of
whether veterans are incompetent to handle VA benefit payments,
and if found incompetent, appoints them a fiduciary. While federal
laws and regulations relate generally to mental competence, the VA's
regulation omits important findings and never reaches the question of
whether a veteran is a danger to himself or others; thus, a veteran
determined to be "incompetent" by the VA is not automatically a
"mental defective" under the Brady standard.26  As such, the VA
need not report veteran names to the gun ban list. However, the VA
incorrectly assumes that veterans appointed a fiduciary do, in fact,
represent a danger to self or others and satisfy the mental defective
standard.27 In its hyper-regulatory effort, the VA is trying to fit a
24. Regulation of individuals "would also not include persons who have been
adjudicated to be suffering from a mental illness but who are not a danger to themselves."
Definitions for the Categories of Persons Prohibited From Receiving Firearms (95R-
051P), 61 Fed. Reg. 47095, 47097 (Sept. 6, 1996). See also Definitions for the Categories of
Persons Prohibited From Receiving Firearms (95R-051P), 62 Fed. Reg. 34634, 34634
(June 27, 1997) (ATF final rule) (codified at 27 C.F.R. § 478.11). Other definitions apply
firearm restrictions to additional categories of individuals such as felons or persons inside
mental institutions; however, that is outside the scope of this Article. Furthermore, this
Article does not stipulate to the constitutionality of the "mental defective" standard.
25. Determinations of Incompetency and Competency, 36 Fed. Reg. 19020, 19020
(Sept. 25, 1971) (codified at 38 C.F.R. pt. 3). ("These are amendments to an existing
regulation which states the criteria and procedures incidental to a Veterans
Administration determination that a beneficiary's mental condition is such that a fiduciary
should manage his affairs and safeguard his funds."). See also Determinations of
Incompetency and Competency, 60 Fed. Reg. 55791, 55791 (Nov. 3, 1995) (codified at 38
C.F.R. pt. 3) ("This document amends the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
adjudication regulations concerning determinations of mental incompetency to make clear
that only rating boards are authorized to make determinations of incompetency for
purposes of VA benefits and VA insurance.").
26. VA regulation 38 C.F.R. § 3.353 (2014) states: "A mentally incompetent person is
one who because of injury or disease lacks the mental capacity to contract or to manage
his or her own affairs, including disbursement of funds without limitation." This standard
does not remotely touch upon a "danger to self or others" standard.
27. Given the fact that 99.3 percent of the names on the gun ban list are from the
VA, we know they are reporting names and are doing so under the alleged cover of the
NICS law. NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-180, §
101(a)(4)(C), 121 Stat. 2559, 2561 (2008) ("If a Federal department or agency under
subparagraph (A) has any record of any person demonstrating that the person falls within
one of the categories described in subsection (g) or (n) of section 922 of title 18, United
States Code, the head of such department or agency shall, not less frequently than
quarterly, provide the pertinent information contained in such record to the Attorney
General."). See also KROUSE, supra note 3, at 27.
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square peg in a round hole. The VA is misapplying and
misinterpreting Brady and NICS provisions resulting in illegal
reporting of names to the national gun ban list. It is indisputable that
the VA is engaging in such behavior because, in order to be placed on
the national gun ban list, a person must be deemed mentally defective
and not simply financially incompetent. The VA provides 99.3% of
the names on that list.
B. Overview of the Procedural Process by Which a Veteran is Deemed
Financially Incompetent
The VA's process to determine mental incompetence is not
particularly robust. The VA adjudications depend wholly on an
analysis by its employees, specifically a Rating Veteran Service
Representative ("rating representative") during the first stage of the
process.' Throughout the process, a face-to-face meeting with a
doctor is not required,2 9 and it is possible for a rating representative to
conclude that the existing medical evidence meets the threshold of
financial incompetence. A friend or family member can refer a
veteran into the VA system out of concern that the veteran is unable
to handle his or her financial affairs. VA employees can also "red-
flag" a veteran during the course of routine visits to a VA facility
when the veteran sees a doctor or when the veteran or any of his or
her beneficiaries meet with VA employees. 0 In other words, not only
will the VA analyze the veteran's competence, but also the
competency of a non-veteran beneficiary of VA Benefits, such as a
28. M21-1MR Part 3, General Claims Process, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
http://www.benefits.va.gov/WARMSIM21_1MR3.asp (Scroll down to "Subpart IV -
General Rating Process;" scroll down to "Chapter 8 - Competency, Due Process and
Protected Ratings;" click on "Section A" document; scroll down to Topic 3: "Process for
Making Competency Determinations"), at 8-A-6 and 8-A-7 (2012).
29. The relevant VA regulation, 38 C.F.R. § 3.353 (2014) ("Determinations of
incompetency and competency"), and VA guidelines contained in M21-1MR do not
require a doctor and patient meeting to determine incompetency.
30. M21-1MR Part 3, General Claims Process, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
http://www.benefits.va.gov/WARMS/M21_1MR3.asp (Scroll down to "Subpart IV -
General Rating Process," scroll down to "Chapter 8 - Competency, Due Process and
Protected Ratings," click on "Section A" document; scroll down to Topic 2: "Considering
Competency While Evaluating Evidence"), at 8-A-4 and 8-A-5. On a personal note, I
had a client that visited a VA Hospital for treatment due to aggravation of service-
connected injuries from a recent car accident. After meeting with a doctor, my client
received a call from a VA employee who asked questions about my client's access to
firearms. My client was an Operation Iraqi Freedom combat-veteran and was rated 100
percent disabled due to service-connected injuries from war, including 50 percent for Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder.
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spouse or child. However, only during meetings with veterans, and
non-veteran beneficiaries, are VA employees directed to operate
under the rule that financial competency is an "inferred issue."" The
VA's decision to immediately target veterans while turning a blind
eye to nonveteran beneficiaries assumes that veterans are inherently
flawed and suspect without basing such a label on any known metric.
In essence, the VA is assuming facts not in evidence and is treating
similarly situated people (those that receive VA benefits) differently.
Such a policy further indicates that the entire process of imposing
firearm restrictions is unfairly targeting the veteran population.
The rating representative prepares a rating decision proposing a
finding of incompetence after the initial meeting with the veteran, or
in the absence of a meeting, with the existent medical evidence.32 The
proposal is based on a "clear and convincing" evidence standard that
the veteran is "incapable of managing his own affairs, including
disbursement of funds without limitation."" The evidentiary standard
does not include an analysis determining whether the veteran is a
danger to self or others.
In the second stage, a Veterans Service Representative, different
from the rating representative in stage one, provides the veteran with
a proposed incompetency rating and the opportunity for a hearing to
contest the proposal.34 If a request for a hearing is not received within
thirty days, the incompetency proposal will stand. During the
hearing, the veteran can present evidence to support his or her
contention that he or she is competent to manage finances. Also, the
veteran may bring an attorney at his or her own cost, or a nonlawyer
service representative from a service organization can be provided to
represent the veteran free of cost." This hearing does not involve any
analysis, evidence, or discussion as to whether the veteran is a danger
to self or others and the veteran is not informed at any point in the
31. Id. (click on "Section A" document; scroll down to Part 2(a) - "Considering the
Competency of a Veteran"), at 8-A-4.
32. Id. (click on "Section A" document; scroll down to Part 3 - "Process for Making
Competency Determinations"), at 8-A-6.
33. Id. Note that this standard does not include a capacity to contract, as does 38
C.F.R. § 3.353 (2014) ("Determinations of incompetency and competency").
34. M21-1MR Part 3, General Claims Process, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
http://www.benefits.va.gov/WARMS/M21 1MR3.asp (Scroll down to "Subpart IV -
General Rating Process," scroll down to "Chapter 8 - Competency, Due Process and
Protected Ratings," click on "Section A" document; scroll down to Topic 3: "Process for
Making Competency Determinations"), at 8-A-7.
35. Kalama, supra note 5, at 2.
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process that he or she is analyzed under that rubric. The sole
articulated standard communicated to the veteran is based on
financial incompetence.16  In stage three, the rating representative
(from stage one) makes a final decision based on the evidence. In
stage four, the representative (from stage three) provides notice to
the veteran. The entire process is exhausted in the absence of a court
order."
It is not surprising that the VA's process to determine mental
incompetence is not particularly engaging or robust. The standard of
review is particularly low ("clear and convincing")," hearsay is
allowed," and there are no significant checks nor balances in place to
ensure proper adjudication of veterans who are a real risk to public
safety." All of this inadequacy would be palatable if the VA limited
the ultimate result to the purpose it was originally designed to serve-
appointing fiduciaries to help veterans with their benefits. But, the
VA employs a process that results in veterans being stripped of their
fundamental rights. When fundamental rights are involved, such as
the Second Amendment, greater levels of procedural protections
must be afforded. When lesser rights are involved, such as appointing
a fiduciary, lower levels of procedural protections can be applied.
Once the veteran is determined incompetent to handle financial
payments, the VA communicates the name of the veteran to the U.S.
Department of Justice, and the name is placed on the national gun
ban list.41  These reporting requirements are arguably the
unconstitutional trigger because once on the list, the named person is
36. Id. The letter from VA does not mention the "mental defective" standard the
veteran will be surreptitiously held to.
37. See id. See also 38 C.F.R. § 3.353 (2014).
38. 38 C.F.R § 3.353(c) creates a clear and convincing standard for evidence ("Unless
the medical evidence is clear, convincing and leaves no doubt as to the person's
incompetency, the rating agency will make no determination of incompetency without a
definite expression regarding the question by the responsible medical authorities.").
39. Procedural Due Process and Appellate Rights, 38 C.F.R § 3.103 (2012), provides
substantive details about the hearing process and specifically, in section (d) of the
regulation, does not institute general federal evidentiary rules, but instead allows for
admission of any type of evidence, which reasonably includes hearsay.
40. As discussed throughout this Article, the purpose of the hearing is to determine
financial competency, not whether the veteran is a risk to self or others.
41. Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, § 103(e)(1), 107
Stat. 1536 (1993); NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-180, §
101(a)(4)(C), 121 Stat. 2559, 2561 (2008).
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effectively prevented from owning or possessing firearms in the U.S. 42
At some point after the veteran is determined to be financially
incompetent, the VA will notify the veteran that he is prohibited from
purchasing, possessing, receiving, or transporting a firearm or
ammunition. If the veteran knowingly violates any of these
prohibitions, he or she may be fined, imprisoned, or both pursuant to
the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act.43
I. The Second Amendment, as a Fundamental Right,
Requires Government Regulation of Firearms to Survive the
Strictest of Scrutiny
The Second Amendment was adopted December 15, 1791, but it
was not defined as a fundamental right until 2010 in McDonald v.
Chicago-almost 219 years without a final "say-so" by the Supreme
Court." Prior to McDonald, in 2008, the Court heard District of
Columbia v. Heller and focused its discussion and analysis on the
meaning of the Second Amendment, but did not define it as a
fundamental right.45 Heller did, however, answer constitutional
questions in relation to the scope of the individual powers contained
in the Second Amendment.46
In Heller, the Court found that the phrase "the right of the
people" does not refer to "collective rights, or rights that may be
exercised only through participation in some corporate body," but
instead refers to an individual right.47 Moreover, the Court
differentiated between the "militia" and "the right of the people,"
holding that the Second Amendment's protections extend beyond the
militia clause to "all members of the political community." 48 The
42. FBI, NICS FACT SHEET, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/nics/general-informatio
n/fact-sheet (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). Not all states participate in the gun ban list and
they cannot be forced to participate: The federal government cannot force the states to
perform work on behalf of the federal government. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,
935 (1997). Instead, the federal government can only incentivize states to participate. Id.
Once reported to the gun ban list, the veteran is also subject to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2014)
("Unlawful acts"), which applies to interstate commerce firearm transactions. This
effectively prevents the veteran from possessing or owning firearms that were transported
through interstate commerce.
43. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2006). See Kalama, supra note 5.
44. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3042 (2010).
45. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 579.
48. Id. at 580-81.
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Court further determined that the clause "to keep and bear Arms" is
an individual right that "guarantees the individual right to possess and
carry weapons in case of confrontation."4 9 And finally, the Court
noted that the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of
confrontation is a right that existed prior to the creation of the
Constitution, Bill of Rights, and federal government."o Therefore, the
right is inherent in each individual and was not created by the Second
Amendment; rather the Second Amendment merely recognized a
right already in existence. The Heller decision is vital because it not
only emphasized the personal nature of the right of self-defense, but
also the Second Amendment's crucial association in restraining the
government from inhibiting the exercise of personal defensive
actions.
Rather than determining whether the Second Amendment is
fundamental, the Heller decision focused on the meaning of the text,
labeling the Second Amendment as a "right."" In McDonald, the
Court's analysis of the Second Amendment concentrated on
incorporation under the Fourteenth Amendment. Here, the Court
held that the Second Amendment articulated a fundamental right and
must be applied equally to the states and federal government.52 This
decision was seminal for Second Amendment jurisprudence. The
court noted Heller's finding that "[s]elf-defense is a basic right,
recognized by many legal systems from ancient times to the present"
and that "individual self-defense is 'the central component' of the
49. Id. at 592.
50. Id. Writing for the Court, Justice Antonin Scalia noted:
We look to this because it has always been widely understood that the
Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendments, codified
a pre-existing right. The very text of the Second Amendment
implicitly recognizes the pre-existence of the right and declares only
that it "shall not be infringed." As we said in United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1876), "[t]his is not a right granted by
the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that
instrument for its existence. The second amendment [sic] declares that
it shall not be infringed."
Id.
51. Heller also did not cast doubt on "long-standing prohibitions" on possession of
firearms by individuals that may represent a danger to the public such as felons and the
mentally ill. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627. Leaving these categories in place fits within the class
of individuals meant to be regulated under Brady laws but, as noted throughout this
Article, the class of individuals regulated by the VA is not deemed mentally ill or
dangerous persons.
52. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010).
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Second Amendment right."" The Court strongly emphasized the
nature of the Second Amendment, that "[i]t cannot be doubted that
the right to bear arms was regarded as a substantive guarantee, not a
prohibition that could be ignored so long as the States legislated in an
evenhanded manner"5 4 and "[iun sum, it is clear that the Framers and
ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the right to keep and
bear arms among those fundamental rights necessary to our system of
ordered liberty."" And, thus, the fundamental nature of the Second
Amendment was recognized.
Taking this in lock-step with Heller, the Court is protecting a
very personal choice of individuals to be armed for the protection of
not just themselves, but their families. The right to bear arms is
intertwined with the right to defend one's life. Reduced to its
essence, it is a right to entertain measures to ensure survival. An
absolute ban on firearms, such as that imposed by the VA,
undermines a person's ability to defend himself and it infringes on the
measures that can be taken to defend life; such an infringement must
subject the federal government to a very strict test.
Even though the Court held the Second Amendment to be a
fundamental right, the Court did not expressly articulate a standard
of scrutiny. It arguably did not need to because, generally speaking,
all fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny-the highest
standard of review. 6 In other words, the government regulation of
the fundamental right will be analyzed under strict scrutiny if it
substantially burdens the exercise of that fundamental right." Thus,
53. Id. at 3023.
54. Id. at 3043-44.
55. Id. at 3042.
56. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("[S]trict scrutiny is the appropriate standard for infringements of fundamental
rights.") (internal citations omitted); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568 (1996)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[S]trict scrutiny will be applied to the deprivation of whatever sort
of right we consider 'fundamental."'); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357
(1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) ("[A] government
practice or statute which restricts 'fundamental rights' or which contains 'suspect
classifications' is to be subjected to 'strict scrutiny' and can be justified only if it furthers a
compelling government purpose and, even then, only if no less restrictive alternative is
available.").
57. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007) (concluding that abortion
procedure regulations that don't "impose an undue burden" on the right to an abortion
need only have a "rational basis"); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992)
("A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation
has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking
an abortion of a nonviable fetus.").
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the opposite may be true of an incidental burden and a lower burden
may trigger a level of review less than strict scrutiny."
There are competing ideas and analyses by a number of
academics predicting how the Court will ultimately define the
standard of scrutiny and whether an undue burden test will be
utilized." This Article, however, takes the position that the
substantial burden test is a proper filter for constitutional analysis.
This test is proper because the VA is imposing an absolute ban on
firearms. This is similar to the Heller case where an absolute ban was
in effect and in which the Court stated, "[u]nder any of the standards
of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights,
banning from the home the most preferred firearm in the nation to
keep and use for protection of one's home and family, would fail
constitutional muster."" In addition, the Court stated that the Second
Amendment "elevates above all other interests the right of law-
abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and
home" and "the enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily
takes certain policy choices off the table. These include the absolute
prohibition of handguns held and used for self-defense in the home
.,. These findings of the Court, and the fact that the Second
Amendment is a fundamental right, give reason to believe that
absolute gun bans will be analyzed through the lens of strict scrutiny.
And when an absolute ban is in place it is, by definition, a substantial
burden on the exercise of that particular constitutional right-in this
case, the Second Amendment.
58. For a more in-depth analysis about differing standards of review, see Michael C.
Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1996).
59. See Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-
Defense: An Analytical Framework and Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1446-
47 (2009) ("I argue that the question should not be whether federal or state right-to-bear-
arms claims ought to be subject to strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, an undue burden
standard, or any other unitary test. . . . [T]here are four different categories of
justifications for a restriction on the right to bear arms": (1) scope; (2) burden; (3) danger
reduction; and (4) government as proprietor. "Paying attention to all four of these
categories can help identify the proper scope of government authority."); Brannon P.
Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Heller, High Water(mark)? Lower Courts and the New
Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1259 (2009) ("And while lower
courts sometimes lament the lack of clarity in Heller regarding, say, what the standard of
review actually was, few judges seem interested in figuring it out on their own.").
60. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628-29 (2008) (internal quotations
and citation omitted).
61. Id. at 635-36.
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A. Based on Existing Regulations, Federal Law, and Relevant Case
Law, the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs Cannot Impose
Firearm Restrictions and Is Limited to Determining Financial
Incompetence in Order to Appoint a Fiduciary
To properly conclude whether or not government action can
constitutionally infringe upon the Second Amendment, the regulatory
action must first be distilled to its core, and the purpose and intent of
the overall government action must be determined. Then, there must
be an understanding of how the government action is applied in a real
world setting; in other words, the analysis must not be limited to what
the government's original regulatory intention was, but what
government is regulating now. Once there is an understanding of the
government activity, it can then be applied to a constitutional filter-
the strict scrutiny standard. This section is the distillation process and
provides a primer for Section B, infra, where the VA regulatory
activity is put through the exacting strict scrutiny test.
The original grant of authority for the VA to promulgate
regulations determining incompetence rests in 38 U.S.C. § 501. This
statutory provision provides that the Secretary may promulgate
"regulations with respect to the nature and extent of proof and
evidence and the method of taking and furnishing them in order to
establish the right to benefits under such laws."6 In addition, the
provision grants the Secretary authority to promulgate regulations
with respect to "the manner and form of adjudications and awards."'
Thus, section 501's plain language evinces an original intent that the
VA's scope of authority to promulgate regulations is limited to
imposing conditions on who qualifies for benefits and how those
benefits will be administered. In other words, the original grant of
authority is squarely based on financial matters and does not allow
the VA to make determinations relative to whether the veteran is a
danger to self or others. And, most importantly, the grant of
authority does not create power to impose restrictions on the Second
Amendment.
With section 501 in hand, the VA promulgated 38 C.F.R. § 3.353,
"Determinations of Incompetency and Competency." Incompetency
is defined in this regulation as "one who, because of injury or disease,
lacks the mental capacity to contract or to manage his or her own
62. 38 C.F.R. § 3.353 contains an authority provision that states the authority to
promulgate the regulation arises under 38 U.S.C. § 501(a)(1).
63. 38 U.S.C. § 501(a)(4) (2014).
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affairs, including disbursement of funds without limitation."" The
definition of incompetence, as used by the VA, is very narrow and
can only be applied to manage insurance or benefit disbursements-it
cannot be applied to determine whether the veteran is a risk to self or
others.6 ' The Code of Federal Regulations ("C.F.R.") is clear in its
direction and unequivocally states "[r]ating agencies have sole
authority to make official determinations of competency and
incompetency for purposes of: insurance (38 U.S.C. 1922), and ...
disbursement of benefits.""
To further demonstrate that the VA's authority is narrowly
measured to administration of funds, the C.F.R. also states, "[i]f...
the Veterans Service Center Manager develops evidence indicating
that the beneficiary may be capable of administering the funds
payable without limitation, he or she will refer that evidence to the
rating agency with a statement as to his or her findings."67 The C.F.R.
tightly moors authority to financial matters and has always done so.
For instance, in 1971 the VA promulgated an amendment to the
C.F.R. that made clear that the primary purpose of finding a mental
condition is "such that a fiduciary should manage his affairs and
safeguard his funds."68 In 1995 another addition to the C.F.R. noted
that the VA is linked to a limited authority to "make determinations
of incompetency for purposes of VA benefits and VA insurance."69
Furthermore, the letter sent to veterans threatening a finding of
financial incompetence explicitly apprises them of the financial
standard: "You must send us medical evidence . . . that says you are
able to handle your own financial affairs . . . if you believe you are
able to handle your VA benefits without anyone's help., 70  And
finally, the single case that analyzed the meaning of the C.F.R.
64. 38 C.F.R. § 3.353(a) (2014).
65. See id. § 3.353(b)(1).
66. Id.
67. Id. § 3.353(b)(3) (emphasis added).
68. Determinations of Incompetency and Competency, 36 Fed. Reg. 19020, 19020
(Sept. 25, 1971) (to be codified at 38 C.F.R. pt. 3) ("These are amendments to an existing
regulation which states the criteria and procedures incidental to a Veterans
Administration determination that a beneficiary's mental condition is such that a fiduciary
should manage his affairs and safeguard his funds.").
69. Determinations of Incompetency and Competency, 60 Fed. Reg. 55791, 55791
(Nov. 3, 1995) (to be codified at 38 C.F.R. pt. 3) ("This document amends the Department
of Veterans Affairs (VA) adjudication regulations concerning determinations of mental
incompetency to make clear that only rating boards are authorized to make
determinations of incompetency for purposes of VA benefits and VA insurance.").
70. Kalama, supra note 5, at 2.
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determined that it was "limited for purposes of insurance and
disbursement of benefits."71
The plain language of section 501 makes clear that Congress did
not intend to give the VA authority to promulgate regulations that
allow it to base their adjudications on whether or not the veteran is a
danger to self or others. Rather, the law and resulting regulation
makes clear that the intent is focused squarely on incompetency
adjudications relating to veteran benefit payments-i.e., financial
matters. This intent is supported by the overall goal of the regulation:
to appoint a fiduciary to safeguard funds. Moreover, the regulation
that was created with section 501's authority in no way attempts to
provide the VA with the legal power to interfere with Second
Amendment rights.72 Thus, the plain language, judicial interpretation,
and overall structure of law limits the VA's power to only determine
financial incompetence; it does not provide authority to determine
the veteran to be a danger to self or others and has no substantive
relation granting any perceived authority to impose firearm
restrictions.
B. The Veterans Affairs' Utilization of the Financial Incompetence
Standard to Impose Firearm Restrictions Is Not Narrowly Tailored
to a Compelling Government Interest and Less Burdensome
Alternatives Exist
The strict scrutiny test is the most stringent standard applied to
government action. In particular, this stringent test applies to
fundamental rights because such rights exist in the upper pantheon of
civil society requiring an exacting burden of proof to warrant legal
interference. The Second Amendment encompasses not just a
fundamental right to a firearm, but is entrenched further into the
philosophical underpinnings of our constitutional republic and
encapsulates the Framers' intent that each man retains the right of
self-defense for himself and his family. With such a personal right at
stake, it is no surprise that the Second Amendment as a fundamental
right can only be infringed when government action is finely tuned to
71. In re Estate of Berg, 783 N.W.2d 831, 834 (S.D. Sup. Ct. 2010).
72. If the government were to argue that the regulation does extend beyond mere
financial incompetence, then another constitutional issue arises, namely whether there was
proper rulemaking authority for the regulation in the first place. The original statutory
provision, 38 U.S.C. § 501, provides the guideposts that the regulation must fit into. As
discussed, the guideposts are limited to financial matters. Thus, if the VA argues the
regulation extends beyond financial incompetence, it is exceeding its prescribed authority.
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target a very specific and compelling government interest and no less
burdensome alternatives to such government action exist.
Thus, in accordance with the subject matter discussed herein, the
VA must prove that the regulatory activity is narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling government interest.73 An example of a
compelling government interest is a pressing public necessity such as
public safety.74 In the context of the absolute firearm ban employed
by the VA, the government is required to find that a veteran is a
danger to self or others in order to fit within the public safety
exception." In addition, the means of achieving that goal requires the
VA to utilize the most efficient and least intrusive method available.
Thus, if there is a more efficient and less intrusive alternative than the
one currently employed, the VA conduct will most likely not satisfy
strict scrutiny. The test is one of skepticism and is designed to protect
the people against invidious government actions, presumably in
instances such as the present when 99.3% of names on the gun ban
list are from the VA." Given that only three years ago, the Supreme
73. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) ("As we stated recently in
Flores, the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the government to infringe . . . 'fundamental'
liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.") (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S.
292, 302 (1993)) (internal quotations omitted); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City
of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993) ("A law that regulates free exercise of religion that is
not neutral or generally applicable must be justified by a compelling government interest
and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest."); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S.
252, 257 (1982) ("The state may justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is
essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest."). See also Thomas v.
Review Bd. of Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) ("The state may justify an
inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving
some compelling state interest.").
74. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("It should be noted, to
begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group
are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional.
It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public
necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never
can."). Constitutional rights are not absolute and this Article takes the position that when
faced with a constitutional challenge on the subject matter discussed herein, the
government will assert that the overriding government interest in the regulation of
firearms is public safety.
75. See supra note 23.
76. 38 C.F.R. 3.353(b)(3) (2014).
77. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) ("When the law lays an unequal
hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same quality of offense and sterilizes
one and not the other, it has made as invidious a discrimination as if it had selected a
particular race or nationality for oppressive treatment.").
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Court determined the Second Amendment to be a fundamental right,
the VA use of its perceived regulatory authority gives birth to novel
constitutional questions."
In this instance, the VA adopted a regulatory scheme based on a
single federal regulation that, when applied, results in denying
veterans the right to possess or own firearms, leads to confiscating
their firearms, and consequently limits their right of self-defense.
This is because the VA determined that these veterans need a little
help with their finances-that they were "financially incompetent."
Quite simply, the regulation was not designed to impose these
firearm restrictions as illustrated by its plain language, which is
circumscribed to assisting those veterans who are unable to contract
or manage their own financial affairs. 9 Moreover, the authority
provision within the regulation is specifically and expressly linked to a
determination of the veteran being unable to handle disbursement of
benefits." It is no surprise, then, that the regulation's sole purpose is
to determine if the veteran is unable to manage his or her finances in
order to appoint a fiduciary."' This purpose is further corroborated by
the explicit reference in a letter sent to veterans informing them that
the standard by which their right to firearms can be infringed is linked
78. There are two main cases the government cites as authority to restrict access to
firearms. One case specifically involved a felon losing his right to possess and own
firearms. Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 824 (1974). The other case looked to
state law to determine the definition of "voluntary admission" into a mental care facility;
and if the defendant fell under that definition, whether the federal government could
prevent him from possessing and owning a firearm under the Gun Control Act. United
States v. Waters, 23 F.3d 29, 30 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 185 (1994). Neither
case involved or determined an inability to manage VA benefits to be grounds for firearm
prohibition.
79. 38 C.F.R. § 3.353(a) (2014) ("A mentally incompetent person is one who because
of injury or disease lacks the mental capacity to contract or to manage his or her own
affairs, including disbursement of funds without limitation.").
80. 38 C.F.R. § 3.353(b)(1) (2014) ("Rating agencies have sole authority to make
official determinations of competency and incompetency for purposes of: insurance (38
U.S.C. 1922), and, subject to § 13.56 of this chapter, disbursement of benefits. Such
determinations are final and binding on field stations for these purposes.").
81. M21-1MR Part 3, General Claims Process, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
http://www.benefits.va.gov/WARMS/M21_1MR3.asp (Scroll down to "Subpart IV -
General Rating Process," scroll down to "Chapter 8 - Competency, Due Process and
Protected Ratings," click on "Section A" document; scroll down to Topic 2: "Considering
Competency While Evaluating Evidence"), at 8-A-4 and 8-A-5. This subsection of the
VA guidelines provides for a "Step 4" (final stage) in the process of determining
incompetency and states a Veterans Service Representative "establishes EP 290 to control
the appointment of a fiduciary, and prepares VA Form 21-592, Request for Appointment
of a Fiduciary, Custodian, or Guardian, for use by the fiduciary activity."
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to their ability to manage their finances, stating that "[y]ou must send
us medical evidence . . . that says you are able to handle your own
financial affairs . . . if you believe you are able to handle your VA
benefits without anyone's help." 82
Most importantly, in addition to the regulation itself, the federal
statutory provision granting the VA the authority to promulgate the
regulation is squarely in line with the financial incompetence standard
and was not designed to impose firearm restrictions.83 The original
intent set forth by the law and regulation were prescribed in the
1970s, almost 40 years before the Supreme Court held the Second
Amendment to be a fundamental right." The regulation's
unambiguous language, the history of its promulgation, and its
execution by the VA do not purport to determine when it is proper to
impose firearms restrictions; it is also not designed to determine if a
veteran is a dangerous person." Yet, irrespective of this
overwhelming evidence, the VA nonetheless exceeds its legal
authority and reports "financially incompetent" veterans to the
national gun ban list.
Although the federal government can utilize existing federal laws
and Supreme Court jurisprudence to restrict firearms from dangerous
and mentally insane persons," the employed VA standard does not
even attempt to determine if veterans are mentally ill and/or a danger
to themselves or others." Although it is well established that the
82. Kalama, supra note 5, at 2.
83. 38 U.S.C. § 501(a)(1)-(4) (2014). The VA's authority to promulgate regulations
is limited to those which "establish the right to benefits under such laws" and the "manner
and form" of the process by which a veteran is to receive the benefits. Id.
84. Determinations of Incompetency and Competency, 36 Fed. Reg. 19020, 19020
(Sept. 25, 1971) (to be codified at 38 C.F.R. pt. 3) ("These are amendments to an existing
regulation which states the criteria and procedures incidental to a Veterans
Administration determination that a beneficiary's mental condition is such that a fiduciary
should manage his affairs and safeguard his funds.").
85. 36 Fed. Reg. Determinations of Incompetency and Competency, 36 Fed. Reg.
19020, 19020 (Sept. 25, 1971) (to be codified at 38 C.F.R. pt. 3) ("such that a fiduciary
should manage his affairs and safeguard his funds"). In 1995, another addition to the
C.F.R. noted that the VA is moored to a limited authority to only "make determinations
of incompetency for purposes of VA benefits and VA insurance." Determinations of
Incompetency and Competency, 60 Fed. Reg. 55791, 55791 (Nov. 3, 1995) (to be codified
at 38 C.F.R. pt. 3).
86. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2014); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627
(2008).
87. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.353(b)(1) (2014). The VA process is specifically aimed at
appointing a fiduciary to manage benefit payments. Id. Moreover, the VA definition of
insanity is not equivalent to mental incompetence). See Disabled Am. Veterans v. United
States Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 783 F. Supp. 187, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
540 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 41:3
Spring 2014] CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF VA'S PROCESS
VA's regulatory efforts is the incompetence standard, further review
demonstrates its weaknesses. For example, existing case law shows
the efforts do not even preclude testamentary capacity" and the
veteran still contains enough mental capacity to file a claim for
benefits.' Common sense dictates that if a veteran retains the legal
ability to execute wills and trusts, can properly file a claim for
benefits, and is not determined to be a danger to himself or the
public, that veteran is not within the class of individuals intended to
be regulated. Thus, when considering all of the facts, existing federal
firearm laws point out that a finding of financial incompetence by the
VA does not equal a finding of a mental affliction that rises to a level
that can legitimately and legally result in the imposition of firearm
restrictions. In light of this analysis, it is apparent that the VA is not
only utilizing a vague standard that allows discriminatory and
arbitrary enforcement, but also improperly subsuming veterans into a
category of persons in which they do not belong. Therefore, the VA
will have no chance of passing constitutional muster because its
regulatory scheme is not narrowly tailored to properly identify
veterans that are a verifiable danger to themselves or to the public.'
88. In re Estate of Berg, 783 N.W.2d 831, 834 (S.D. Sup. Ct. 2010). In addition,
throughout the United States views diverge on whether testamentary capacity and
contractual capacity are the same or different. The existence of one does not necessarily
disprove or prove the other's invalidity. Therefore, even if the VA standard precluded
testamentary capacity, it may not preclude contractual capacity, which still leaves the VA
standard in weak footing. See 1 PAGE, THE LAW OF WILLS §12.20 (citing cases from
Connecticut (Turner's Appeal, 44 A. 310 (Conn. 1899); Doolittle v. Upson, 88 A.2d 334
(Conn. 1952)); Georgia (Griffin v. Barrett, 187 S.E. 828 (Ga. 1936)); Tennessee (Bruster v.
Etheridge, 345 S.W.2d 692 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1961)); Texas (Brown v. Mitchell, 31 S.W. 621
(Tex. 1895); Venner v. Layton, 244 S.W.2d 852 (Tex. App. 1952))). See also In re Kester,
167 N.W. 614 (Iowa 1918)); Chandler v. Barrett, 21 La. Ann. 58 (1869) (citing Aubert v.
Aubert, 6 La. Ann. 104(1851))). The courts have held that testamentary capacity is higher
than contractual capacity. Thus, if one can execute a will or trust in these states, they most
certainly contain a sound enough mind to be considered mentally competent.
89. M21-1MR Part 3, General Claims Process, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
http://www.benefits.va.gov/WARMS/M21_1MR3.asp (Scroll down to "Subpart V -
General Authorization Issues and Claimant Notifications;" scroll down to "Chapter 9 -
Authorizing Awards for Incompetency and Fiduciary Cases;" click on "Section B"
document; scroll down to Topic 4(d): "Claims From Beneficiaries Rated Incompetent"), at
9-B-3 (2012) ("An application received from a claimant who has been rated incompetent
for VA purposes may be accepted, even if a fiduciary has been appointed for the claimant.
A VA rating of incompetency under 38 C.F.R. § 3.353 (2013) determines the claimant's
incapacity to handle his/her own affairs, including disbursement of funds. It does not
preclude the claimant from prosecuting a claim for benefits.").
90. The VA's regulatory regime is mostly standardless, and such an approach is at
odds with the Social Security Administration's guidelines, which attempt to define bipolar
and schizophrenic standards for benefit purposes. See 5 SOCIAL SECURITY PRACTICE
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In spite of the overwhelming evidence demonstrating that the
VA cannot impose firearm restrictions, the VA may make a last-ditch
effort to satisfy constitutionality by arguing that they are relying upon
a veteran's inability to contract because of the plain language of the
regulation: "a mentally incompetent person is one who because of
,,91injury or disease lacks the mental capacity to contract . . . .
However, the meaning of "mental capacity to contract" is not
defined; it also cannot be properly defined because each state creates
its own contract code, which is interpreted by that state's courts.' It is
probable that a number of states will have a slight variation
depending on the specific affliction-mental or physical-that
undercuts an individual's precise ability to contract.3 This creates a
dilemma if a federal court were forced to determine what the ability
to contract means in the context of the C.F.R. The federal courts
could invariably hold differing interpretations.94  But, the
constitutional analysis is much simpler than that because there is no
GUIDE § 40.01 (lists a number of mechanisms and standards for analyzing individuals to
determine if they are mentally compromised. Such detail does not exist with the VA
system and such a standardless approach contributes to the arbitrary and unconstitutional
nature of the VA actions).
91. 38 C.F.R. § 3.353(a) (2014).
92. There is a divergence of views throughout the United States on whether
testamentary capacity and contractual capacity are the same or different. Thus, the
existence of one does not necessarily disprove or prove the other's invalidity. See
LexisNexis 1 PAGE, THE LAW OF WILLS § 12.20. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS: CAPACITY TO CONTRACT § 12 (1981) ("Historically, the principal categories
of natural persons having no capacity or limited capacity to contract were married women,
infants, and insane persons. Those formerly referred to as insane are included in the more
modern phrase "mentally ill," and mentally defective persons are treated similarly."). The
mental capacity to contract, according to the Restatement, provides further guidance for a
factfinder to conclude that insane persons, mentally ill persons, and those deemed
mentally defective are all in the same general category. Veterans regulated by the VA do
not fit in these categories of persons because they still have the capacity, as found through
case law interpreting the VA regulations discussed herein and through the VA's own
admission, to self-file VA claims and to enter into testamentary instruments which,
according to some states, equals the ability to contract. See supra note 88.
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: MENTAL ILLNESS OR DEFECT § 15
("It is now recognized that there is a wide variety of types and degrees of mental
incompetency. Among them are congenital deficiencies in intelligence, the mental
deterioration of old age, the effects of brain damage caused by accident or organic disease,
and mental illnesses evidenced by such symptoms as delusions, hallucinations, delirium,
confusion and depression.... [A] person may be able to understand almost nothing, or
only simple or routine transactions, or he may be incompetent only with respect to a
particular type of transaction.").
94. See, e.g., United States v. Waters, 23 F.3d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1994). The court looked
to state law to determine what voluntary admission means in the context of determining
whether someone fell within the regulatory authority of the Gun Control Act. Id.
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federal government requirement that a person who owns a firearm
must prove to the federal government that he or she has the capacity
to contract in order to fire his weapon. Rather, in imposing firearm
restrictions, the government must prove that an individual is a danger
to self or others. The VA does not employ this standard.
In conclusion, the C.F.R.'s original intent is to identify veterans
who are unable to manage their finances and appoint a fiduciary to
handle such benefits." The C.F.R. does not determine if a veteran is
a risk to self or others and does not provide authority to conclude a
veteran cannot manage a firearm. Currently, this investigatory
regime wrongly assumes that if a veteran is appointed a fiduciary, he
or she represents a danger to the public and is reportable to a
national gun ban list. The standard employed by the VA is not
narrowly tailored because it sweeps into the net individuals who may
be perfectly able to manage a firearm and not determined to be a
danger to self or others.96 The absurd and arbitrary nature of the
VA's conduct is a material defect that ultimately results in an
unconstitutional, and surreptitious, exercise of government power.
Congress surely did not contemplate this when drafting the Gun
Control Act and Brady legislation.
1. Illustrations of Less Burdensome Alternatives
To protect the fundamental nature of the Second Amendment,
heightened procedural safeguards must be put in place.' With a bit
of creativity one can piece together a regulatory scheme that is less
burdensome on the Second Amendment and veteran than the
95. 38 C.F.R. §13.56 (2014) (direct payment rules for appointed fiduciaries); 38
U.S.C. § 5502 (2005) ("Payments to and supervision of fiduciaries"); 38 U.S.C. § 5507
(2005) ("Inquiry, investigations, and qualifications of fiduciaries"). See also KROUSE,
supra note 3, at 27. M21-1MR Part 3, General Claims Process, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS
AFFAIRS, http://www.benefits.va.gov/WARMS/M21-1MR3.asp (Scroll down to "Subpart
V - General Authorization Issues and Claimant Notifications;" scroll down to "Chapter 9
- Authorizing Awards for Incompetency and Fiduciary Cases;" click on "Section A"
document; scroll down to Topic 2: "Considering Competency While Evaluating
Evidence"), at 8-A-4 and 8-A-5. This subsection of the VA guidelines provides for a
"Step 4" (final stage) in the process of determining incompetency and states a Veterans
Service Representative "establishes EP 290 to control the appointment of a fiduciary, and
prepares VA Form 21-592, Request for Appointment of a Fiduciary, Custodian, or
Guardian, for use by the fiduciary activity."
96. And to go a step further, placing a person in the same category as convicted
criminals and the mentally insane besmirches and denigrates reputations and is borderline
defamatory.
97. To ensure protection of the Second Amendment, the federal government should
divest itself from imposing firearm restrictions.
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patchwork currently in place. If there is a regulatory scheme that is
less burdensome on a person's ability to exercise his Second
Amendment right, the original scheme is arguably unconstitutional. 8
It should be noted that the government cannot argue against less
burdensome tests simply because it is more onerous and more
expensive to the government.9 Protection of constitutional rights
cannot be contingent on the monetary cost to the government. While
this Section does not address every complication, it will offer limited
examples to illustrate that the current system is not narrowly tailored
because there are less burdensome alternatives available to achieve
the purported government interest of public safety.
The federal government operates a regulatory mandate that all
veterans be analyzed under a rubric to determine if that veteran can
adequately manage his or her VA benefit payments. But, this finding
may result in an assumption that veterans cannot manage a firearm
and that they are dangerous people. These findings ultimately result
in the denial of a veteran's right to possess and own a firearm-a loss
wholly at odds with constitutional guarantees. There are three
instances in which manipulations to the current rubric will result in a
less invasive attack on the Second Amendment and at the same time
will reduce or entirely eliminate the burden on the individual.
The first instance pertains to a veteran's initial meeting with
nondoctors. A veteran is not required to meet with a doctor, but he
or she can meet with a nondoctor who sets the entire mechanism in
motion." Instead of meeting with a nondoctor to begin the process
of determining incompetence, there should be two doctors: a
physician and a psychiatrist. This system more properly balances the
evidence and protects a veteran from an incorrect diagnosis. It will
be more burdensome for the government, but less burdensome to the
98. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32
(1993); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982) ("The state may justify a limitation
on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding
governmental interest."); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718
(1981).
99. Barbara Kritchevsky, Is There a Cost Defense? Budgetary Constraints as a
Defense in Civil Rights Litigation, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 483 (2004). See also Forsyth County,
Georgia v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133 (1992) (raising revenue for police
services does not justify a parade fee requirement); Schneider v. State of New Jersey,
Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) (burden of caring for the streets does not
justify a ban on distributing leaflets to willing recipients).
100. The relevant VA regulation, 38 C.F.R. § 3.353 ("Determinations of incompetency
and competency"), does not require a doctor and patient meeting to determine
incompetency and neither does the VA guidelines contained in M21-1MR.
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individual and Second Amendment rights because medical
professionals are placed at the beginning of the process to determine
a medical diagnosis. Cutting back on incorrect diagnoses will reduce
the number of individuals wrongly transited through the process.
The second instance pertains to the standard in assessing a
veteran's threat to public safety. Currently, a hearing is required if a
doctor reasonably believes, based upon clear and convincing medical
evidence, that a veteran is incompetent to handle his or her finances.
However, the hearing does not investigate whether the veteran is a
danger to self or others. To protect Second Amendment rights, the
VA should be required to find, based on clear and convincing
evidence, that a veteran is at danger of inflicting grievous bodily
injury or death on self or others due to a severe and pervasive mental
or physical injury or disease."o' In addition, the government must so
find under the authority of two doctor opinions: one physician and
one psychiatrist. Thus, these two doctors must have medical evidence
that the veteran meets this standard and the evidence must be
presented at a subsequent hearing so that the veteran can properly
challenge it in a neutral setting.02 Importantly, a temporary illness,
such as one suffered by a veteran recovering from complicated
surgery, will not suffice.103 The affliction must be severe to the point
that both doctors feel the veteran has the potential to inflict grievous
bodily injury or death on self or others. This is in lockstep with
current constitutional findings in this Article because the compelling
government interest in precluding an individual from possessing or
owning a firearm cannot be anything but personal or public safety.
Therefore, if the government can determine the veteran to be a
"danger subject," then it can take away weapons; but, absent that
101. This proposed standard aims to reduce the number of veterans wrongfully
transited through the VA process. It would require the government to prove that a
veteran is a dangerous person by providing facts and circumstances, such as a severe and
pervasive mental illness, that supports the reasons for which the government deems the
veteran dangerous.
102. The imposition of a requirement that the VA motion a court before reporting a
veteran's name to the NICS list is discussed in more detail in Section II.C.3, infra.
103. As the standard currently postulates, the VA does not discriminate between a
transient or pervasive mental illness. As such, a veteran using Vicodin after invasive
surgery could be subjected to the rigors in place by the VA. The same is true of PTSD.
See How Common is PTSD?, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, http://www.ptsd.va.gov/
public/pages/how-common-is-ptsd.asp (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
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finding, the government's rationale for taking firearms is not founded
on constitutional footing."
The third instance is for the VA, and federal government
generally, to stop utilizing the underlying assumption throughout the
regulatory process that a veteran who cannot manage his or her
finances is also unable to adequately and safely operate a firearm, and
therefore, is concurrently a danger to the public and must ultimately
be barred from use and possession of a firearm."' This assumption is
the core of the VA regulatory scheme and it fails constitutional
muster because it places a massive burden on the veteran to prove he
is "worthy" and "able" to safely operate a firearm-without the VA
providing the means for the veterans to actually prove he can do so.
Moreover, in spite of the VA's regulatory scheme, the federal
government at large does not require potential purchasers of firearms
prove they can adequately and safely operate a weapon before
exercising their Second Amendment right. However, even if that
standard existed within federal law it would not pass constitutional
muster because the federal government does not have the authority
to require every individual in the United States to undergo gun
training in order to purchase a weapon. Under current jurisprudence,
it would be just as unconstitutional for the federal government to
require a woman to physically practice having an abortion before she
is legally allowed to exercise her constitutional right to go through
with the procedure.'" The Court has held that abortion is an
104. To eliminate the risk of bias, the government should be required to motion a
court to enforce the VA's ruling. See infra note 139.
105. Attacking and eliminating this assumption would, in effect, eliminate the VA
reporting veteran names to the gun ban list. The VA is making a huge leap in logic and
assumes that a veteran who is financially incompetent fits the standard of a dangerous
person which thereafter allows the federal government to prevent that veteran from
owning or possessing a firearm out of concern that the veteran is a risk to the public. The
reasoning of the VA and federal government does not make sense because a veteran
appointed a fiduciary by the VA to handle his VA benefits is never determined to actually
be a risk to the public and, therefore, that veteran is not in the class of individuals
intended to be regulated by federal gun law.
106. The example illustrates that requiring an "access to rights test" for an abortion
before going through with it would undoubtedly be unconstitutional given the substantial
burden test outlined in Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876-77
(1992), and addressed in this Article. If the same "access to rights test" were applied to
the Second Amendment, the regulation would also fail. The Supreme Court has held that
both an abortion and self-defense are intensely personal and, in that vein, they create
similar arguments as to what can and cannot be a constitutional burden. For example, the
Court has held that abortion is a personal right: "These decisions make it clear that only
personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,' are included in this guarantee of personal privacy." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
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intensely intimate and personal right-as is self-defense; thus, based
on the fundamental nature of abortion, a substantial impediment to
acquiring one would be to require physically practicing the highly
invasive procedure before the medical event." Since the right to
firearms and abortion are both deemed fundamental by the Supreme
Court, substantial impediments to the exercise of that constitutional
right-such as proof of satisfactory operation of a weapon system-
would likewise run afoul of the basic principle that fundamental rights
cannot be subject to substantial government interference. The effect
of such government action devalues the inherent importance of that
right.08 But, more significantly, the Second Amendment is an
enumerated right, whereas abortion is not. The right to firearms is
held in high regard within the philosophical foundation of society
and, therefore, any interference with that right must be of the utmost
compelling purpose and as narrowly tailored as possible so that there
are no less burdensome alternatives available.
These few examples illustrate that there is a less restrictive
means to achieve the compelling government interest in public safety.
If veterans were to meet with two doctors and an analysis were
performed as to the veteran's danger to self or others, it would reduce
152 (1973) (internal citation omitted). And the Court specifically stated the right to
abortion is implicit in the concept of liberty: "This right of privacy, whether it be founded
in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state
action, as we feel it is, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's
reservations of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." Id. at 153. The Court reaffirmed its stance in
Casey: "After considering the fundamental constitutional questions resolved by Roe,
principles of institutional integrity, and the rules of stare decisis, we are led to conclude
this: the essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once against reaffirmed."
Casey, 505 U.S. at 845-46. Likewise, the Court has also held that the Second Amendment
is a personal right: "Self-defense is a basic right, recognized by many legal systems from
ancient times to the present day, and in Heller, we held that individual self-defense is the
'central component' of the Second Amendment right." McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130
S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010). Just like abortion, the Court held that the Second Amendment is
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty: "In sum, it is clear that the Framers and ratifiers
of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the right to keep and bear arms among those
fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty." Id. at 3042.
107. Id.
108. The general argument being made should not be construed as being pro-life or
pro-choice. Rather, it is to illustrate that federal government regulation of firearms, in the
manner that the VA is engaging, is a massive government overreach because the
government conduct devalues the fundamental nature of the Second Amendment. The
argument then draws a corollary to a fundamental right that the Supreme Court
determined to be extremely personal-abortion-to make the case that if the Court is to
be consistent, it should strike down the VA regulatory activity that is the subject matter of
this Article.
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the number of veterans who are unnecessarily precluded from
possessing and owning firearms. The current scheme is not designed
to identify individuals that truly are at danger of inflicting grievous
bodily injury or death.
II. The Veterans Affairs' Use of the Financial Incompetence
Standard and Resulting Firearm Restrictions Do Not Comport
with Fifth Amendment Procedural Due Process Requirements
At its core, procedural due process requires notice, an
opportunity to be heard, and proper procedural safeguards to prevent
the infringement of a person's constitutional rights." As it currently
stands, the VA procedure does not comply with procedural due
process requirements.
The VA does not consider that a veteran will lose access to
firearms because the sole purpose of the hearing is to determine
whether the veteran requires a fiduciary to manage VA benefits.
Moreover, the standard employed does not determine whether a
veteran is a danger to inflicting grievous bodily injury or death on
oneself or others, but the VA assumes that a veteran is in fact a
"danger subject" once he or she is appointed a fiduciary. The
standard utilized by the VA is vague, but also eerily surreptitious. It
creates the very real risk of discriminatory and arbitrary enforcement,
a byproduct that constitutional due process eschews."o
This Section employs the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test in a
step-by-step process by first dissecting the origins of the right to
firearms under a liberty and property interests, and then applying that
interest to the balancing test. This Section concludes that the VA
must utilize a standard determining whether a veteran is a danger to
self or others, which would arguably be a ground to eliminate access
to firearms."' In addition, the VA must apprise veterans of the actual
standard they are held to-a standard that is aimed at determining if
they are a "danger subject." Furthermore, the arbitrary standard in
109. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) ("[Tihe Due
Process Clause provides that certain substantive rights-life, liberty, and property-
cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures.").
110. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972) ("Where, as here,
there are no standards governing the exercise of the discretion granted by the ordinance,
the scheme permits and encourages an arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the
law.").
111. However, as this Article asserts, the best way to ensure Second Amendment
guarantees are protected is to exclude the VA from injecting itself into the issue of
absolute firearm bans in the first place.
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play results in discriminatory application against veterans who
comprise 99.3% of the national gun ban list-a result fundamentally
at odds with the Second Amendment and procedural due process.
A. Veterans Have Liberty and Property Interests in Their Firearm
The Fifth Amendment states no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law.112 "Life, liberty,"" 3
and "property""4 are problematic to define, and in order to activate
the requirements of procedural due process, the claimant must
illustrate a defined constitutional right."' In the case at bar we have a
clearly defined "constitutional right"-possessing and owning a
firearm.16
Depending on the type of constitutional interest at stake, the
requirement of a hearing may or may not apply. However, the
Supreme Court has enlarged the scope of interests that demand a
hearing before intentional deprivation."' In the context of liberty
interests, procedural due process jurisprudence requires hearings
when a fundamental constitutional liberty interest is at stake, such as
when the right to marry or raise a family is restricted."8 In addition,
the Supreme Court has gone so far as to hold that there is a liberty
interest when a student is threatened with suspension from school
such that procedural due process demands a hearing prior to
112. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
113. The Supreme Court has defined "liberty" to include freedom from restraint on
one's opportunities, as well as freedom from imprisonment. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S.
341, 348-49 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710-11 (1976); Bd. of Regents of State
Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972).
114. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970) (Prior to termination of welfare
benefits, a hearing is required; welfare benefits are statutory entitlements and should be
regarded as "property" rather than a "gratuity.").
115. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257-58 (1983) (An unmarried father has no
absolute right to a hearing before the adoption of his child, when he has had no significant
relationship with the child.); Inv. Annuity, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 609 F.2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (A constitutionally protected property interest is not actionable unless the person
affected is deprived of the actual property or a common law or statutory right.).
116. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010).
117. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972) (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 577) (A
lack of contractual claim does not defeat constitutional property considerations because
existing rules and understandings that stem from independent sources can give rise to
constitutional property claims that require a hearing before deprivation.).
118. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768-69 (1982) (A state cannot refuse to
provide natural parents adequate procedural safeguards in a parental rights termination
proceeding on the grounds that the family unit already has broken down.).
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suspension."9 In the school suspension case, Goss v. Lopez, the
Supreme Court held that "[t]he Due Process Clause also forbids
arbitrary deprivations of liberty. 'Where a person's good name,
reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the
government is doing to him,' the minimal requirements of the Clause
must be satisfied."120 This description also applies to veterans wrongly
labeled as a danger to the public who not only lose their good name
and reputation, but also lose their ability to engage in self-defense. A
veteran has a liberty interest in the exercise of his or her fundamental
Second Amendment rights, and if a child cannot be suspended from
school without a hearing, the VA is also required to put forth a
hearing specifically regarding imposition of Second Amendment
restrictions.
In the context of a property interest, the Supreme Court broadly
defines what a property interest is and expands its scope to include
more than tangible personal property."' For example, a teacher may
have a property interest in continued employment if the facts and
circumstances indicate a detrimental reliance on a promise of
continued employment.'2 2 With the case at bar, one need not make a
nebulous property argument because a veteran can directly point to a
loss of property-his or her firearm. As long as there is a tangible
property interest, such as a firearm in danger of confiscation by the
government, a hearing must occur prior to deprivation of that
property.2 3
Supreme Court jurisprudence provides more than reasonable
constitutional justification that not only justifies a liberty interest in
possessing and owning firearms under the Second Amendment, but
also a property interest in the firearm itself. Because liberty and
119. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975).
120. Id.
121. Roth, 408 U.S. at 571-72 (1972) ("The Court has also made clear that the
property interests protected by procedural due process extend well beyond actual
ownership of real estate, chattels, or money. By the same token, the Court has required
due process protection for deprivations of liberty beyond the sort of formal constraints
imposed by the criminal process.").
122. Id. at 577 ("Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution.
Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or
understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those
benefits.").
123. Goss, 419 U.S. at 576 ("The Court's view has been that as long as a property
deprivation is not de minimis, its gravity is irrelevant to the question whether account
must be taken of the Due Process Clause.").
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property interests exist, a proper hearing must occur prior to
deprivation.
B. The Failure of the Federal Government to Hold a Hearing Prior to
Deprivation is Unconstitutional
The process by which a veteran is deemed financially
incompetent is discussed in Section I.B, supra. The hearing that
occurs determines financial incompetence; it does not discuss Second
Amendment issues or whether the veteran is a danger to self or
others. The hearing's sole purpose is to determine if the veteran can
adequately manage VA benefit payments; if the veteran is deemed
unable to adequately manage his or her VA benefits, a fiduciary is
appointed to the veteran. There is no hearing that specifically
discusses potential prohibition of weapons. On its face, there is no
attempt by the VA to determine whether the veteran is a danger to
public safety.
That a hearing discussing Second Amendment rights is not part
of the VA process, which results in the deprivation of keeping a
firearm is, on its face, an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty and
property interests.124 If a pre-deprivation hearing is required for non-
fundamental rights such as welfare benefits, the Supreme Court will
likely side with a veteran when his or her weapon and right to possess
and own a firearm in the future is taken away without a hearing.125
The entire VA process is a violation of procedural due process
because the federal government does not provide a hearing prior to
121the deprivation of the right to keep and bear arms.
C. Mathews v. Eldridge Test: What Process is Due?
Mathews v. Eldridge127 is the seminal case establishing a balancing
test to determine what process satisfies procedural due process. In
Mathews, the Supreme Court held that procedural due process
imposes constraints on governmental decisions that deprive
124. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380
U.S. 545, 552 (1965)) ("The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to
be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."').
125. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970) (citing Charles A. Reich,
Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255
(1965)). See also Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
126. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58
(1974)) ("This Court consistently has held that some form of hearing is required before an
individual is finally deprived of a property interest.").
127. Mathews, 424 U.S. 319.
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individuals of "liberty" or "property" interests within the meaning of
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.128 The Court
further held due process is not a technical conception, but a flexible
one that calls for such procedural protections depending on the facts
and circumstances of the case.12
The test consists of three balancing factors: (1) individual interest
involved; (2) procedural safeguards to that interest; and (3)
governmental interest in fiscal and administrative efficiency.o This
Section discusses all three factors as applied to the VA's intentional
deprivation of liberty and property, and concludes that the process
afforded veterans does not satisfy the demands of procedural due
process.
1. An Individual Has a Strong Interest in His or Her Fundamental Right
to Keep and Bear Arms
Here, the individual interests involved are both a liberty and
property interest under the Second Amendment. The liberty interest
is the fundamental right to exercise the Second Amendment and the
property interest is the firearm itself. Both of these interests are
infringed upon: Once a veteran is deemed financially incompetent, his
or her ability to possess and own a firearm is extinguished and his or
her firearms can be confiscated. The Supreme Court has held that
the degree of potential deprivation that may be created by a
particular decision is a factor to be considered in assessing the validity
of any administrative decisionmaking process.' Thus, in the case at
bar, the hardship imposed on an erroneous deprivation is extreme
and potentially lifelong.'32
Because the individual's liberty and property interests are
fundamental, the process afforded must be tailored to adequately
protect an erroneous deprivation. Here, such protection is not in
128. Id. at 333.
129. Id. at 335.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 343.
132. An incompetency determination is supposed to be appealable subject to 38
C.F.R. § 3.103(f) ("Procedural due process and appellate rights"), and the competency
status can change. M21-1MR Part 3, General Claims Process, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS
AFFAIRS, http://www.benefits.va.gov/WARMS/M21 1MR3.asp (Scroll down to "Subpart
IV - General Rating Process;" scroll down to "Chapter 8 - Competency, Due Process and
Protected Ratings;" click on "Section A" document; scroll down to Topic 4(b):
"Determining Restored Competency"), at 8-A-9 (2012). In addition, 18 U.S.C. § 925
("Exceptions: relief from disabilities") provides for a mechanism to delete a veterans
name from the gun ban list.
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place because the VA does not offer a hearing that involves a
discussion as to whether the veteran is a danger to self or others.
Rather, the hearing specifically addresses whether the veteran lacks
the ability to manage VA benefits and, if so, the veteran is assigned a
fiduciary. Thus, there is no hearing designed with the Second
Amendment in mind and, ultimately, Second Amendment interests
are not merely affected, but are potentially extinguished from a
person's life. The Supreme Court is clear on this absolute ban of
exercisable fundamental rights; if a proper hearing is not provided, an
unconstitutional process exists.133
2. The Procedural Safeguards in Place to Protect the Fundamental
Nature of the Second Amendment Do Not Pass Constitutional Muster
Procedural safeguards require the government to have certain
procedures in place to prevent an erroneous deprivation of rights.134
The goal of the VA hearing is to appoint a fiduciary, thus the
procedural safeguards are presumably designed to act on behalf of
that goal. With the goal of appointing a fiduciary in mind, it is easier
to understand why the current procedural aspects of the VA hearing
system are sorely lacking in constitutional protections; the hearing
simply was not designed to deal with constitutional rights, it was only
designed to appoint a fiduciary. In this light, the current procedural
safeguards are more than enough. However, when the ultimate result
and underlying goal of the hearing is to infringe on Second
Amendment rights, a new calculus enters the equation. As this
Section expresses, once constitutional rights are involved, the due
process requirements ramp up considerably-and rightly so. The
current hearing regime does not have proper and fair procedural
safeguards in place and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
constitutional rights is immense for the following reasons.
First, the government does not require that a doctor meet with a
veteran prior to the hearing to determine mental and physical status.
Thus, the VA can institute proceedings on a hunch, not on recent and
relevant medical evidence; this risks increasing the number of
133. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)
("The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard "at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.").
134. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335-36 ("More precisely, our prior decisions indicate that
identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of...
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards."). See, e.g.,
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-71 (1970).
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wrongly targeted veterans. Second, the VA is not required to
determine if the veteran is a real danger to self or others, even though
that is the required standard to impose firearm restrictions under
federal law. Third, the hearing's purpose is to determine whether the
veteran is capable of managing VA benefits. However, the standard
the veteran is held to, if found to be incapable of managing benefits,
is one that connotes the veteran to be a real risk to self or others.
Thus, the veteran walks into the hearing attempting to prove one set
of facts under a standard of "financial incompetence," but ultimately
the veteran is subject to a standard of "risk to self or others." In
effect, the veteran is subsumed and labeled under a standard in which
he or she was not originally apprised of and a standard that he or she
was not given an opportunity to challenge. Therefore, the veteran is
never afforded true proper notice of the impending government
action, nor does a proper pre-deprivation evidentiary hearing take
place. Fourth, the veteran will lose his legal right to possess and own
firearms already purchased, and will presumably be subject to
confiscation-an issue the hearing does not address. Finally, the
hearing is inherently biased because the presiding individuals are VA
employees; thus, there is no neutral decisionmaker.
Procedural due process requires, at a minimum, proper notice
and an opportunity to be heard.' Under the current VA regulatory
scheme, not only are veterans not notified about the real standard of
review under which they will be analyzed, but they are not provided
an actual forum to challenge the Second Amendment implications of
the VA's regulatory attempts. Therefore, the VA's regulatory
scheme lacks proper procedural safeguards and offends procedural
due process.
3. The Government Interest in Fiscal and Administrative Burdens Do
Not Outweigh the Constitutional Demands to Protect the Right to
Keep and Bear Arms
The Supreme Court has held that the process afforded must be
balanced with the function of the hearing and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that additional procedures would create.136
135. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349 (citing Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (The essence of due process is
the requirement that "a person in jeopardy of serious loss [be given] notice of the case
against him and opportunity to meet it.")).
136. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 336 ("the Government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail"). See, e.g., Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 263-71.
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The function of the VA hearing is to determine financial
incompetence and appoint a fiduciary to manage VA benefits.
However, the effect of the hearing is much broader in that a
determination of financial incompetence results in a deprivation of
Second Amendment rights. In order to adequately apprise veterans
about the true repercussions of the hearing and to allow a proper
challenge to prevent those repercussions, an entirely new hearing
system should be implemented.' The new system must protect the
personal and fundamental right of self-defense from unfair
governmental burdens, and it must balance fiscal and administrative
burdens.
The new system should mandate that a doctor meet with a
veteran to medically assess, based on clear and convincing evidence,
whether the veteran is at danger of inflicting grievous bodily injury or
death to self or others. Then, a psychiatrist should meet with the
veteran to make sure the diagnosis is medically accurate. Such a
requirement would not cause an outrageous fiscal burden to the
government because it already employs doctors at VA facilities.138 In
addition, the hearing itself must offer a proper forum to adequately
challenge whether the veteran is a danger to self or others. This
means that the veteran must be told that the standard of evaluation is
not just "financial incompetence" but, as this Article proposes,
"danger of inflicting grievous bodily injury or death on self or others."
Moreover, the hearing should comply with federal evidentiary rules
and allow the veteran, or his or her representative, to cross-examine
witnesses to test their veracity and credibility. These changes will
increase the administrative burden, but it is clear that the interests
advanced by the government do not justify the current burdens
imposed on veterans' Second Amendment rights.
To alleviate the danger of nonneutrality and bypass the
inherently unfair VA process currently in place, a veteran should not
be considered adjudicated under the new standard without a finding
of judicial authority."' Mandating the VA to acquire a court order
137. The suggestions in this Section assume that the VA will continue reporting names
to the gun ban list, but for the sake of constitutionality, the VA should cease reporting.
138. See supra note 99 (noting that the government will have difficulty claiming that a
financial burden is so large as to justify invading a fundamental right).
139. Mandating judicial involvement is not novel. In fact, 18 U.S.C. § 4241 requires
that a judicial hearing occur prior to the federal government institutionalizing a person for
mental illness. There is a liberty interest in not being committed just as there is a liberty
interest in firearm possession and ownership. Both liberty interests are highly personal,
and if a judicial hearing is required before the infringement of one liberty interest, then it
555
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
prior to reporting a name to the gun ban list may be more acceptable
than any other changes because once found to be a danger to self or
others, the individual is subject to firearm confiscation.'4 Thus, at
some point, a government agency will presumably confiscate the
weapons. Prior to confiscation, the government will need a court
order. Since the government is already required to make a court
appearance for the purposes of obtaining the court granting
confiscation, it is not overly burdensome to also ensure proper
procedural due process at the same time. Requiring the federal
government to jump extra hurdles before infringing on fundamental
rights is not outrageous and is proposed in the Veterans Second
Amendment Protection Act.141
Going to court, however, is not without further constitutional
landmines. Will a federal court recognize the new standard set forth
by the VA? Does the state provide for more Second Amendment
protections than the federal government? In light of the recent
Defense of Marriage Act ruling in United States v. Windsor, it appears
the federal government is now required to defer to state law in
determining if a same-sex couple is legally married; if so, that couple
will qualify for some federal benefits.42 If the federal government
defers to same-sex laws in the states regarding federal benefits,
Windsor may force the federal court to defer to state gun laws when
receipt of some federal benefits (e.g., VA benefits) creates a clash
between federal and state gun laws. For example, in United States v.
Waters, state law was used to define "voluntary admission" into a
mental care facility for federal regulatory purposes; if the defendant
fell under that state definition, the federal government could prevent
should be the same for the other. In fact, the House of Representatives and the Senate
drafted legislation requiring the VA to acquire an order from a "judicial authority" before
imposing firearm restrictions. See infra note 141. Moreover, the primary purpose of the
court order requirement proposed in this Article is to force the federal government to
prove that the veteran truly is a danger to himself or others, in front of a neutral party with
the requisite knowledge, skill, discipline and maturity acquired from practicing law over a
period of years or decades. And finally, the requirement of going to court essentially
negates the entire VA process, which is intentional because the VA process is inherently
unfair.
140. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) prevents the "possession and ownership" of firearms and the
only way to enforce is to confiscate.
141. Veterans Second Amendment Protection Act, H.R. 577, 113th Cong. (introduced
by Rep. Steve Stockman on Feb. 6, 2013) and S.572, 113th Cong. (introduced by Sen.
Richard Burr on Mar. 14, 2013), available at www.congress.gov.
142. See generally United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
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him from possessing and owning a firearm under the Gun Control
Act.143
The cost of these changes is not a controlling factor in deciding
what constitutional due process is (and is not)." While the burden to
the government will increase, an ominous regulatory burden is on the
veteran in the exercise of his right to firearms. This is unacceptable in
light of the fundamental nature of firearms and in light of the strict
scrutiny standard which places the burden on the government. The
proposed additional safeguards are not the full extent of those that
are necessary to comply with the protection of constitutional rights,
but are examples of safeguards that can ensure the proper protection
of a fundamental right against an overbearing government with
endless resources. More often than not it is the individual bending to
the mercy of the federal government; procedural safeguards are
designed to level the playing field, shift the evidentiary burden to the
government, and force the government to prove the justification for
curtailing an individual's constitutional rights. If the government
argues that the simple changes proposed in this Article are too
expensive and burdensome, then government's attempt to deprive
veterans of their Second Amendment rights should not be
entertained in the first place. Fundamental rights require the highest
of care, and the government cannot be so willing to entertain
inadequate procedural safeguards.
HI. Available Legislative Options to Adequately Protect the
Second Amendment and Procedural Due Process
Lawmakers have realized the constitutional implications of the
VA's regulatory regime and the inherent unfairness of targeting
veterans. In an effort to alleviate these constitutional issues,
Members of the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate
introduced the Veterans Second Amendment Protection Act, which
imposed two major changes to the current regulatory activity: (1) a
person who is mentally incapacitated, deemed mentally incompetent,
or experiencing extended loss of consciousness cannot be considered
mentally defective unless; (2) a judicial authority finds the person a
danger to self or others.145 This new test addresses some of the
143. United States v. Waters, 23 F.3d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1994).
144. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) ("Financial cost alone is not a
controlling weight in determining whether due process requires a particular procedural
safeguard prior to some administrative decision.").
145. Veterans Second Amendment Protection Act, supra note 141.
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problem areas in the current system. With these proposed changes
the federal government would be forced to prove not just financial
incompetence, but that the veteran is a danger to self or others before
moving to institute and enforce a firearm ban.46 Furthermore, the
federal government would be required to prove in court that the
person to be regulated is in fact a danger to self or others.147
These proposed changes would not prevent the VA from
reporting names to the national gun ban list. However, the proposed
changes would require the VA to retool and reconfigure their
procedural process. For instance, the VA would no longer be able to
merely inform a veteran that there is evidence demonstrating his or
her inability to handle benefit payments. Instead, the VA would be
required to inform the veteran that there is evidence indicating that
he or she represents a danger to self or others. Moreover, an
evidentiary hearing would take place to determine whether that is, in
fact, the case. Finally, once the administrative side is exhausted, the
government would be required to enter a courtroom and argue before
judicial officers.
Although it is not constitutionally required, the introduced
legislation should have offered even more protections. As this
Article proposes, the VA should be required to base its findings on
the interpretation of two doctors, including a psychiatrist. This will
greatly aid in preventing veterans who are not a danger from being
swept up in this arduous process.148 Additionally, the legislation does
not address the confiscation of weapons. If a veteran's firearm must
be confiscated, then the veteran must be informed of the pending
confiscation.149 Lastly, the legislation should qualify the standard of
"danger to self or others" as a danger of inflicting grievous bodily
injury or death. As it stands, the legislation leaves the language open
to interpretation, which can be abused in future rulemaking, just as
the current C.F.R. has become overextended.
Overall, the introduced legislation would adequately protect
veterans from government's unconstitutional infringement on
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. The VA backlog is tremendous; so much so that the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals ordered a complete overhaul of the VA benefit processing system because the
length of delays amount to constitutional violations. See Carol J. Williams, Court Orders
Major Overhaul of VA's Mental Health System, L.A. TIMES (May 11, 2011), http://articles.
latimes.com/2011/may/11/local/a-me-0511-veterans-ptsd-20110511.
149. In the alternative, a veteran should be allowed to keep the firearms, but not
allowed to keep ammunition.
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veterans' Second Amendment rights. It more narrowly tailors the
government's rubric by requiring the government to determine if the
veteran is a danger to self or others-but only by court order. In
addition, should the legislation become law, it will demand that the
government constitutionalize the procedure by which a veteran is
adjudicated.
Conclusion
The federal government's use of power to regulate firearms in
the context of VA incompetency is unconstitutional. The VA takes
the position that its authority allows for a financial incompetence
standard that results in the prohibition of current and future firearm
possession and ownership. Such perceived authority is outrageous in
light of the clear intent of the regulations as evidenced through its
historical roots, federal statutes, and federal case law. As it is
employed today, the VA's standard of incompetence is not narrowly
tailored and is unconstitutional because the VA regulatory process
does not consider if a veteran is a danger to self or others in order to
restrict firearms. In order to regulate the possession and use of
firearms, the government's standard should be one that determines
whether a veteran is a danger to self or others and, more specifically,
whether a veteran is at danger of inflicting grievous bodily injury or
death upon self or someone else. The current VA standard fails in
this regard.
Aside from the standard used by the VA, the process that a
veteran is subjected to is likewise unconstitutional. First, a proper
hearing to determine whether a veteran is a danger to self or others
never occurs. Second, the hearing that does take place only
determines whether a fiduciary should be appointed and has nothing
to do with firearm restrictions. Third, after a fiduciary is assigned, the
veteran is barred from possessing and owning firearms-a draconian
result that not only conflicts with the fundamental nature of the right
to keep and bear arms, but also clashes with the natural right of self-
defense. The federal government's procedural process lacks proper
notice and an opportunity to be heard and, therefore, fails to protect
the liberty and property interests of the veteran. Such failures are
blatant violations of procedural due process afforded by the
Constitution.
Each individual has a fundamental right to keep and bear arms.
The federal government can infringe upon this right only if it can
prove that its method of regulation is narrowly tailored to a
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compelling government interest. The VA standards and process of
adjudication in place simply do satisfy this requirement. Therefore,
the VA's regulatory regime and process of adjudication not only
unfairly target the veteran population, but are unconstitutional as
unwarranted infringements on the Second Amendment and
procedural due process.
